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REPORT DISCLAIMER 
The contents of this report reflect information concerning the County of Hawaii and 
Puna Geothermal Venture obtained during a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(U.S. EPA) review. The emergency response plans review visits were conducted from 
August 5-9, 1996 and observations as presented in this report provide a snapshot of 
conditions existing at the facility at that time.  They do not represent proposed or 
ongoing changes at the facility or Hawaii County.  The recommendations and 
observations contained in this report are not mandatory actions that the facility or 
Hawaii County must implement.  In addition, the U.S. EPA makes no assurances that 
if implemented, the recommendations and observations contained in this report will 
prevent all future chemical accidents, equipment failures, or unsafe management 
practices, and/or provide protection from any future enforcement actions under any 
applicable law or regulation. EPA takes notice that some of the recommendations 
in the draft report have been adopted already. 
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Executive Summary 
This report summarizes a review of emergency response capabilities for Hawai’i 
County and Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV). The U. S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) assembled an independent team of experienced 
individuals (the “Review Team”). EPA tasked them to review emergency 
response plans and conduct site visits and interviews. This project was a follow-
up to the EPA’s 1995 compliance inspection of the PGV facility and a response to 
community requests. The purpose of the project was to provide an independent 
evaluation of the emergency response plans, with the long–term objective of 
preventing chemical accidents and improving emergency response capabilities. 
The review team conducted site visits in Hawai’i from August 5 through August 
9, 1996. During that time, team members received information from state and 
local agencies, PGV, and the community (composed primarily of area residents). 
EPA held public meetings at the Pahoa Community Center and the University of 
Hawai’i, Hilo Campus Center to discuss the review. These meetings offered the 
review team an opportunity to meet with residents of the Puna area. 
Many who attended the public meetings expressed strong concerns about their 
health and safety being jeopardized by the operation of the PGV facility. A major 
release of hydrogen sulfide from the facility is the principal hazard to the 
community. The public also expressed concern about the need for public alert and 
notification systems and plans for shelter-in-place and evacuation. Some meeting 
attendees raised concerns that PGV management was concealing details about 
operations and potential emergencies from the neighboring community. Other 
meeting attendees expressed confidence in the capabilities of the PGV 
management to operate the facility safely and efficiently. 
The Hawai’i County Emergency Operations Plan is a multiple hazards plan that 
primarily addresses natural disasters, terrorism, and war. Annex M of this plan, 
the Oil and Hazardous Substances Response Plan, was the section reviewed in 
detail by the review team. The review team found Annex M in urgent need of an 
update to bring it into compliance with Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know laws and address public concerns. Annex M is not complete, and 
the County and State have not updated the plan since they signed it in 1990. 
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The Oil and Hazardous Substances Response Plan (Annex M) acknowledges 
accidental releases of hazardous substances as human-made hazards. However, it 
does not address the public and environmental threats from a serious release of 
hazardous substances from an operating facility (e.g., PGV). The plan also lists 
several appendices as “under preparation.” However, at the time of the review, 
these appendices were still missing. 
In particular, the Review Team was concerned about the capability of local 
responders to carry out a timely response in the PGV facility. Hawai’i County 
responders need to evaluate their capacity for emergency response and their ability 
to participate as part of an Incident Command System. The Hawai’i County Fire 
Department, Pahoa Substation should work with PGV to gauge the potential 
severity of an incident. 
During the site visit to PGV, facility personnel explained both the technology and 
procedures within their respective areas of responsibility. Overall, the facility’s 
internal planning, preparedness and response activities are covered in PGV’s 
Emergency Response Plan. PGV seems able to respond to most incidents, except 
fire. However, at the time of the review the PGV Emergency Response Plan did 
not fully address coordination issues between the facility and the local response 
agencies. The Review Team has concerns over public alert and notification 
procedures and the ability of the facility and County to carry out a coordinated, 
timely response. PGV’s historical, and continuing, reluctance to communicate 
and cooperate with its neighbors interferes with effective emergency management. 
The Review Team recommends that the County form a technical work group to 
evaluate evacuation needs, resources, and procedures. The technical work group 
should include representatives from the County Civil Defense Agency and Fire 
Department, HDOH, the University of Hawai’i, and EPA. Work group members 
should confer with PGV technical staff on the details of facility operations. 
Technical issues under evaluation are extremely important and will require a great 
deal of thought, research, and professional judgement. 
Both PGV and the County need to coordinate their planning activities and conduct 
joint training exercises before they can understand the capabilities of local fire, 
police and medical units. The results of the initial training exercise will likely 
reveal deficiencies in the emergency response plans. Joint exercises held at least 
annually would identify how to update and improve the emergency response 
plans. Periodic exercises also would be refresher training for PGV personnel and 
local hazardous materials (hazmat) responders. As required by the Emergency 
Planning and Community-Right-to-Know Act, the County and PGV need to 
designate community and facility emergency coordinators. These emergency 
coordinators should take the lead on planning and carrying out the exercises. 
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The review team concluded its work with specific findings and recommendations 
for improving emergency response capabilities and safety management systems. 
These recommendations address Hawai’i County and PGV emergency response 
plans and procedures. EPA issued the draft report for a 100-day public review 
and comment period, after which EPA reviewed and responded to all 
commentors’ letters. 
Comment letters and EPA’s response to comment document are included as an 
attachment in the final report. In closing, the review team must emphasize that an 
emergency response plan alone does not directly protect the public and the 
environment. The plan is only a detailed blueprint of an emergency response 
program designed for a facility or community, with the purpose of protecting the 
environment and the public. Emergency response programs are the comprehensive 
approach to protecting the public. 
In addition to complete, updated and coordinated emergency response plans, 
jurisdictions and industries must have the required resources, equipment and 
trained personnel, to be fully prepared to implement the plans and respond to 
accidents resulting from man-made hazards as well as natural disasters. Finally, 
the authorities responsible for the emergency response programs must be assured at 
all times that the programs are workable. They need feedback through the results 
of scheduled periodic exercises. 
ix 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
This report presents a review and evaluation of emergency response capabilities for 
Hawai’i County and Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV). The purpose of this review was to 
provide an independent evaluation of emergency response plans, with the long-term 
objective of preventing chemical accidents and improving emergency response capabilities. 
The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assembled an independent team of 
experienced individuals and tasked them to conduct the review. The Review Team 
functioned in an advisory role. Although all recommendations are based on laws, 
regulations or good management practices, this report is not an enforcement document. 
1.2 Scope 
The scope of the independent review was to: 
1. Provide a desk review and evaluation of the emergency response plans for the County 
of Hawai’i, Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) and local responders and provide 
constructive comments; 
2. Meet with representatives of state agencies to discuss issues of concern regarding 
geothermal in Hawai’i; 
3. Meet with Hawai’i County Civil Defense, the Hawai’i County Fire Department and 
other local agencies to evaluate the capability of Hawai’i County, PGV and local 
responders to carry out the emergency response plans; 
4. Review the roles and responsibilities of these agencies in protecting the public and the 
environment from hazardous material releases, particularly in populated areas near PGV; 
5. Visit the PGV facility and meet with the facility management to learn of its plans for 
prevention of hazardous material releases; further review the facility’s emergency response 
plan, concept of operations, organization, incident command system, protective actions, 
and supporting systems required to carry out the plan; 
6. Evaluate chemical hazards associated with substances handled and stored in the PGV 
facility and learn what the management of the facility recognizes as the hazards posing 
acute health effects; 
7. Meet with public officials in Hawai’i County and residents in the Puna area to learn 
their concerns about chemical hazards, risks, and chemical accident preparedness; 
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8. Attend public meetings conducted by EPA to hear public concerns and questions about 
the emergency response plans. 
1.3 Community Concerns 
EPA held public meetings in Pahoa and Hilo, Hawai’i on August 7 and 8, 1996. During 
the meetings community residents raised concerns about hazards that could have acute or 
chronic health effects. Acute health effects can result from exposure to high 
concentrations of hazardous substances. Long term exposure to lower concentrations of 
hazardous substances can cause chronic health effects. The focus of the Emergency 
Response Review was acute health effects resulting from accidental releases, and the 
Review Team did not look at chronic effects. Table 2 at the end of this section 
summarizes specific comments and questions community residents asked during the public 
meetings. 
1.4 Legal Authorities 
Multiple legal authorities govern the releases of hazardous substances. The Review Team 
worked under the authorities of the following laws: 
!  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601 - 9675 (1995). Sections 9604(b) and 9604(e) authorize EPA to enter a facility 
and gather information when illness or complaints of illness may be attributable to 
exposure to a hazardous substance. This is the legal authority that EPA used to enter 
PGV and seek information during the Review Team’s site visit; 
!  Emergency Planning and Community Right–to–Know Act (EPCRA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 – 11050 (1995). EPCRA requires local emergency planning 
committees (LEPCs) to develop emergency response plans to prepare for and respond to 
potential chemical accidents. Sections 11001–11003 address emergency planning and 
require community and facility emergency coordinators, who make determinations 
necessary to implement the plan. Section 11001 requires LEPCs to establish rules by 
which they function, that include provisions for public access to committee activities and 
emergency response plans. LEPCs are also required to establish procedures for receiving 
and processing requests for information from the public, and emergency plans, chemical 
inventory reports and emergency notification reports are available to the public. Section 
11003 also requires LEPCs to gather appropriate information to develop and update their 
emergency response plans, and facilities to provide information to LEPCs. Section 11004 
requires emergency release notification. 
Sections 11011–11012 cover reporting requirements, including requesting and obtaining 
EPCRA information from a facility when a request for such information is made by the 
public. Section 11013 specifies toxic release inventory (“TRI”) reporting, and EPA is the 
agency responsible for enforcing this law. Section 11044 requires LEPCs to publish as a 
legal notice in a newspaper an annual notice of public availability of EPCRA 
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reporting information. 
!  Clean Air Act, Prevention of Accidental Releases, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (1995), and 40 
CFR Part 68 Chemical Accident Prevention: Regulated Substances for Accidental Release 
Prevention and Risk Management Plan Requirements. Under the general duty clause in § 
7412(r)(1), each industrial owner or operator has a general duty to design and maintain a 
safe facility, taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. They also have a duty 
to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur. EPA is the agency 
responsible for enforcing this law. 
In addition, the Review Team was aware of State laws pertaining to emergency planning. 
!  1994 Supplement to the Hawai’i Revised Statutes, Volume 3, Chapter 128D 
Environmental Response Laws and Chapter 128 E Hawai’i Emergency Planning and 
Community Right–to–Know Act; 
!  Paragraph 128E–5, in Chapter 128E of the Hawai’i Emergency Planning and 
Community Right–to–Know Act describes the establishment and function of LEPCs. At 
least one local emergency planning committee has to be established in each county. The 
committee is subject to the requirements of both Chapter 128E and section 11003 of the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right–to–Know Act described above. 
1.5 Background 
In 1991 two incidents occurred at the PGV facility during the drilling of geothermal wells 
KS-7 and KS-8. On February 21, 1991 a steam kick occurred at well KS-7; this incident 
is described in Table 1 at the end of this section. On June 12, 1991 a blowout at well KS­
8 resulted in a 31-hour release of steam and approximately 2,247 pounds of hydrogen 
sulfide (H2S), and the County evacuated nearby homes. A characteristic of a well blowout 
is a sudden, very forceful, uncontrolled release to the atmosphere. This high pressure 
release transported large volumes of brine, steam, and gases from the deep geothermal 
reservoir through the well. When a release contains hazardous materials such as H2S, and 
if at sufficiently high concentration levels, it can pose an immediate danger to the facility 
employees, the public, and the environment. 
In 1992 three releases occurred at PGV during well drilling, testing, and plant startup; the 
following year several releases occurred as well. Although most of these releases of H2S 
have been small and below the reportable concentration of 25 ppb, the concentrations 
have been measurable and have occurred throughout the years since 1991. PGV has 
reported many H2S releases, neighbors to the facility have measured or sensed some 
releases, and local newspapers have reported others. These smaller releases are a 
continuing cause of concern among some residents adjacent to the PGV facility. As noted 
in the summary of public comments in Table 2, some residents have expressed a distrust of 
the safety aspects of well drilling and the operation of PGV’s geothermal facility overall. 
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Through all of this, the affected public did not receive first hand, detailed knowledge of 
what caused the releases or what could be done to prevent them. Some community 
residents expressed a lack of confidence in the facility operators to control releases of 
hazardous materials and in State and County authorities to provide a proven workable 
emergency response plan. Thus, the EPA assembled an independent team of experienced 
individuals, the “Review Team,” and tasked them to review the emergency response plans 
for Hawai’i County and Puna Geothermal Venture. 
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Table 1. Summary of Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) Releases. From 1991 to 1996, several releases of hydrogen sulfide occurred at PGV 
during well drilling, testing, and plant startup. Information about these releases, summarized below in Table 1, is provided as background 
information and to clarify the causes, duration, emissions and sources of information of each release. 
Release and Date Cause and Duration H2S Emissions Source of Information 
Steam kick of short “Well KS-7 was drilled through an intensely Not stated Independent Technical 
duration occurred at the mineralized zone, had minor mud flow returns Investigation of the Puna 
KS-7 injection well during connections below 1500', and blew out at Geothermal Venture 
being drilled by PGV. 1678', injuring a right hand. The driller quickly Unplanned Steam Release 
closed the annular preventer and vented fluid out June 12 and 13, 1991. 
February 21, 1991 a 3-inch diverter, before closing the diverter and 
securing the well. At the time of the incident, the Report prepared by Richard 
annular preventer, which was secured to 13-3/8 Thomas, Dick Whiting, James 
inch casing cemented at 1020', served as the sole Moore and Duey Milner for 
BOPE. The well was subsequently plugged and The Honorable Lorraine R. 
suspended. According to PGV’s proposal, flow Inouye, Mayor, County of 
into the hole was not anticipated to occur at this Hawai’i, and The Honorable 
relatively shallow depth.” William W. Paty, 
Chairperson, Board of Land 
and Natural Resources, July 
1991. 
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Release and Date Cause and Duration H2S Emissions Source of Information 
Blowout of well KS-8 
June 12, 1991 
“The blowout caused an unabated release of steam 
for a period of 31 hours before PGV succeeded in 
closing in the well. The report finds that the 
blowout occurred because of inadequacies in 
PGV’s drilling plan and procedures and not as a 
result of unusual or unmanageable subsurface 
geologic or hydrologic conditions.” 
“Not only did PGV fail to modify its drilling 
program following the KS-7 blowout, but they 
also failed to heed numerous “red flags” (warning 
signals) in the five days preceding the KS-8 
blowout, which included a continuous 1-inch flow 
of drilling mud out of the wellbore, gains in mud 
volume while pulling stands, and gas entries 
while circulating mud bottom up, in addition to 
lost circulation, that had occurred earlier below 
the shoe of the 13-3/8-inch casing.” 
“PGV personnel took appropriate steps to control 
the well following the kick. However, there were 
certain inadequacies in PGV’s drilling operations 
and blowout prevention equipment. The mud 
cooler being used was inefficient. Monitoring 
equipment was not strategically placed. A 
sufficient supply of cold water was not available 
to pump into the wellbore to properly kill the well 
in the event of a blowout. The choke line was not 
of sufficient diameter to handle the volume of 
fluid that had to be vented, and there was no 
silencer on the end of the choke manifold line to 
reduce noise.” 
Approximately 2,247 
pounds of H2S were 
released during the 
period June 12 through 
June 14, 1991. 
Independent Technical 
Investigation of the Puna 
Geothermal Venture 
Unplanned Steam Release 
June 12 and 13, 1991. 
Report prepared by Richard 
Thomas, Dick Whiting, James 
Moore and Duey Milner for 
The Honorable Lorraine R. 
Inouye, Mayor, County of 
Hawai’i, and The Honorable 
William W. Paty, 
Chairperson, Board of Land 
and Natural Resources, July 
1991. 
Puna Geothermal Venture 
Compliance Investigation, 
NEIC report dated March 
1996 (for emission data). 
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Release and Date Cause and Duration H2S Emissions Source of Information 
Release at well KS-9 
February 8, 1993 
“Thirty minute clean out caused excessive 
emissions from the cyclonic muffler over two to 
four minute period. Inadequate mixing with 
NaOH in the flow line.” 
“SE station 23 ppb 
hourly average. 
Mobile H2S 
concentration 250 ppb 
spike.” 
Puna Geothermal Venture 
Compliance Investigation, 
NEIC report dated March 
1996. 
Release at Brine Booster 
pump 
October 4, 1996 -- Note 
that this release occurred 
after the Review Team 
visited PGV. 
An abnormal condition occurred due to a 
separator level control valve malfunction causing 
a loss of lubricant to the Brine Booster pump 
mechanical seal. This upset condition resulted in 
an inadvertent discharge of injectate and steam. 
Monitor Station A 
recorded an emission 
peak of 301.7 ppb and 
an hourly average of 
46.9 ppb. 
PGV Incident Report #961004 
submitted to Nolan S. Hirai, 
State of Hawai’i Department 
of Health, Clean Air Branch, 
by Darren Hunt, PGV 
Environmental/Safety 
Coordinator on 10/9/96. 
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Table 2. Summary of Public Comments.  EPA received the following comments during public 
meetings held August 7, 1996 at the Pahoa Community Center and August 8, 1996 at the 
University of Hawai’i, Hilo Campus Center. The purpose of these public meetings was to allow 
members of the Review Team to hear community comments, including existing emergency 
response capabilities and plans and other general comments. The comments made during the two 
meetings are grouped under general categories of concerns pertinent to the elements in the PGV 
Emergency Response Plan as required by the Geothermal Resource Permit Condition #26 and the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. 
General Comments Specific Questions and Comments 
Facility Description with 
Potential Hazards 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
What is coming out of the geothermal wells, and is it 
toxic to humans? What is the well constituency? 
What is in the brine (geothermal constituency)? What 
is the composition of geothermal fluids? 
How does geothermal “soup” act? 
What is pentane? Where does it go? No one has 
accounted for the amounts. 
What are the health effects of pentane? 
What records are required for pentane and caustic soda 
and where are they maintained? 
Is PGV required to report amounts used? Are the 
reviewers looking at safe storage and use? 
Are lead or other chemicals going into water 
catchment? 
Emergency response to what? 
We cannot limit the emergency response plan to 
hydrogen sulfide. 
Concerned about particulate matter (PM10) and sulfa 
treat. 
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Potential Emergencies 1. Concerned about respiratory problems. 
2. Smell odd chemical smell. 
3. How would one know of exposure to pentane? 
4. The community is suffering from many symptoms. 
5. Smell hydrogen sulfide strongly. 
6. Concerned about the health effects of noise. 
7. Concerned about the low level exposure to chemicals 
(chronic effects). 
8. Compare people (health impacts) in Upper and Lower 
Puna. 
9. We have sensitive populations -- from infants to senior 
citizens. 
10. They did not provide reference documents to the 
public. 
11. School children are within a four-mile radius of the 
facility (PGV). 
12. We should be considered a sensitive community at 
risk. 
13. Affected on hourly basis. 
14. Ten percent of school children have asthma and 
respirators. 
15. An emergency exists now. 
16. We need complete information. A hazards analysis 
should be based on complete geochemical data. 
17. People have a right to know what “they” are being 
poisoned with, especially regarding organic farming 
and effect on crops. 
18. Problems with data information especially about leaks 
(from DOH, for example). 
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Natural Hazards and 1. What is the nature of the geology? 
Potential Emergencies 
2.	 Unique geographical area — lava fields. The island of 
Hawai’i is on the East Rift Zone with the most active 
volcano in the world — look into the geology of the 
island. 
3.	 Concerned about geothermal / seismic activity. 
4.	 Will the Review Team meet with the U. S. Geological 
Survey to discuss the relationship with PGV and 
natural factors (geologic issues)? 
5.	 Please assess volcanic hazards and corroborate with 
experts. 
6.	 Talk with local geologists. 
7.	 Study the history of PGV/problems — bulldozes over 
well. 
8.	 Concerned about the blowout of 1991. 
9.	 Do not know how to cap wells. 
10.	 Concerned about emergency steam release from the 
facility (PGV). 
11.	 Concerned about problems with well casings and 
casing embrittlement. 
      August, 2000 Final Report - 11 
Emergency Communication 
With Residents, Potential 
Emergencies and Response 
Measures 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
PGV has not installed any lead or radon monitors. 
Are air monitors in proper areas? We need one in 
Pahoa? 
How are they monitoring other chemicals? (Other than 
hydrogen sulfide?) 
We need a reality check on monitors. 
They need data to do air modeling ' scenarios 
properly. 
Stationary monitors all run by electricity (then no data 
available). 
Public agencies need an answering service. We have 
had delays in getting information from stationary 
monitors (this is especially bad on weekends and at 
night). 
Timely access to monitoring data should be available 
to families so they can decide what their emergency 
response should be – even without a major incident. 
Coordination with Outside 
Parties and Emergency 
Communication with 
Residents 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
People most affected by PGV are requesting the 
Emergency Response Plan. They should be the focus 
of the plan. 
Who is left “holding the bag” for the costs of the 
Emergency Response Plan? 
What will be necessary to bring the facility into 
compliance? 
Confidential business information re: the emergency 
response plan is an issue. 
How can they promulgate the plan without addressing 
geothermal resource issues? 
PGV should make its emergency response plan 
available to the public they alert (violating the permit). 
How does the plan deal with peoples’ culture? 
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Emergency Communications 
with Public Agencies and 
Residents 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Public is not aware of County Emergency Operations 
Plan or PGV Emergency Response Plan ' denied 
process. 
PGV version 6.0 (older) is available in the library. 
How will we know about releases of reportable 
quantities of other chemicals (refer to page 34 of the 
NEIC report)? 
They do not provide information. 
One commenter was not in the loop for documents. 
Warning Systems 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Releases into the neighborhood. Air monitors reported 
spikes of 1,000 parts per billion (ppb), and they 
notified no one. 
We cannot hear the siren; we have no coverage in our 
area. 
Who will notify neighbors in Kehena Beach? 
They cannot get people out in emergencies. 
How will they notify schools? 
Does County Civil Defense think they can make 
notification? 
Have toxicologists review a draft report. 
Company decides if an emergency exists. 
Will they notify National Response Center? 
Who is in charge of deciding there is an emergency? 
No warning, no alert given for 1992 incident 
(bulldozers on I-beams on well) — do not know 
current condition of that well. We at least need a 
“warning system.” 
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Evacuation Plans 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
What is the radius for evacuations from a hydrogen 
sulfide release? 
What roads will we use for evacuations? 
Who will call and they will call who for evacuations? 
Buses take two loads of children — in evacuations. 
How can we evacuate the area in a worst-case 
scenario? 
How do authorities plan to evacuate most of the 
population of Puna? 
Lightening strikes can hit transmission lines. 
We need a contingency to handle the flow when an 
emergency is occurring. 
Do people know evacuation routes? 
Alternate evacuation routes are nonexistent. 
Concern over only (!) road and ability to evacuate 
large number of people. 
Chain of Command 1. 
2. 
Is this plan implementable? 
Sign-off on PGV’s Emergency Response Plan should 
be by County Civil Defense — not the mayor. 
Response Equipment 1. 
2. 
We do not have enough ambulances and fire 
equipment/supplies. 
How will the Review Team determine if workers can 
properly use safety equipment? 
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Fiscal Concerns 1.	 What are the costs of the Review Team for travel and 
services? Is the EPA paying these costs with our tax 
dollars? Who invited the Review Team? 
2.	 What is the complete accounting of what a blow out 
cost the county? How much has it cost Hawai’i 
County to deal with geothermal? 
3.	 PGV should be required to carry insurance to cover all 
damages caused by accidents. 
4.	 Does the EPA have the authority to look at economic 
impacts as part of the ER plan? 
5.	 How do we balance impacts on nearby community and 
larger community? 
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Emergency Response Plan 1.	 Do review completely and analytically. 
Review Process 
2.	 Need the complete story to know what impacts would 
be. 
3.	 What will happen if they do not adopt 
recommendations? What will happen if PGV is not in 
compliance? 
4.	 Confer with Dr. Wilson Goddard. Nothing has been 
done with Dr. Goddard’s recommendations. 
5.	 When will PGV supply additional info? 
6.	 Dr. Rifferstein (?), Sulfide Institute, Alberta, Canada. 
Talk to him. 
7.	 Fact finding vs. inspection. These are ERP reviews. 
8.	 Has the EPA received all data from wells? 
9.	 Where else in the last few years has EPA Region 9 
reviewed ERPs for other geothermal facilities? 
10.	 What authority does the EPA have to conduct such a 
review? 
11.	 What sanctions are there? 
12.	 What are the specific questions the Review Team will 
be asking the workers? 
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Other Concerns 1.	 Political issues get overlooked. 
2.	 This is not a new or static situation. 
3.	 Kittens are dying. 
4.	 Why is there a plant in a neighborhood — no SARA 
involvement? Why not? 
5.	 DOH deficiencies for managing environmental 
programs. 
6.	 OSHA documentation is a concern. 
7.	 OSHA criteria are not applicable to the surrounding 
community. 
8.	 Air modeling for various chemicals (twelve scenarios) 
in light of new info. 
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2 The Review Team 
The Review Team comprised the following persons who brought considerable experience 
in chemical accident prevention, chemical safety reviews, and emergency and risk 
management planning. Team members also had experience working in the private sector 
and local, state, and federal governmental departments and agencies. 
Paul Hill, Ph.D., in 1996 was the Executive Director of the National Institute for 
Chemical Studies, in Charleston, West Virginia. Since the site visit, the Congress has 
funded Dr. Hill to serve on the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board in 
Washington, D.C. 
Randy Sawyer, Manager of the Risk Management and Prevention Program, in Contra 
Costa County, California, has worked in the private and public sectors in emergency 
management, accident prevention and community notification systems. 
Mark Zusy, Supervisor of the Chemical Accident Prevention Program for the State of 
Nevada, is a chemical engineer and a licensed mechanical engineer. His experience ranges 
from process and mechanical design to operating procedure development, operator 
training and startup coordination. 
The following people worked with the review team to complete this project: 
Mike Ardito, EPA Region 9, Superfund State Project Officer Chemical Emergency 
Prevention and Preparedness (CEPP) Coordinator for Hawai’i, has worked in emergency 
management programs for FEMA and EPA since 1987. 
Åke Jacobson (Senior Environmental Enrollee), a member of EPA Region 9’s chemical 
accident prevention program, is a chemical engineer with experience as project engineer 
and project manager in engineering and construction of chemical process plants. 
Dianna Young, EPA Region 9, Community Involvement Coordinator (for public 
meetings in Pahoa and Hilo). 
Sandra Carroll, EPA Region 9, CEPP Coordinator for Nevada, was the Risk 
Management Program Manager for Region 9 at the time of the site visits. Currently a 
Ph.D. student at the University of Nevada, she wrote and edited this report. 
Vicki Rosen, EPA Region 9, Community Involvement Coordinator, has written fact 
sheets and met with community members to discuss their concerns. 
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Planning and Operating Safely 
3.1 Guidelines for Facility Emergency Response Planning 
Before the Review Team could evaluate emergency response plans and capabilities for 
PGV, Team members first had to review the requirements that PGV followed to prepare 
its emergency response plan. In 1989, the Hawai’i County Planning Commission required 
PGV to prepare an emergency response plan, as Condition #26 of PGV’s Geothermal 
Resource Permit. PGV wrote and submitted its emergency response plan to the 
Administrator of the Hawai’i County Civil Defense Agency, who then reviewed and 
approved it in August 1990. The emergency response planning requirements in Condition 
#26 are presented below in Table 3. 
Table 3. Components of PGV’s Emergency Response Plan. The Hawai’i County 
Planning Commission required that PGV’s plan include but not be limited to the following 
elements. The Commission also required PGV to make its plan available to the public. 
Planning Elements Description 
Geothermal Resource Permit Condition #26 
a. Facility Description ' A description of the project facilities and operations, 
with site plans identifying areas of potential hazards, 
such as high pressure piping and the presence, storage 
and transportation of flammable or hazardous 
materials, such as lubrication or fuel oil, pentane, 
hydrogen sulfide, and sodium hydroxide. 
b. Local Responders ' A description of emergency services available off-site 
to respond to any emergency. 
c. Chain of Command ' A description of the current onsite chain of command 
and responsibilities of project personnel in the event of 
an emergency. 
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d. Potential Emergencies and A description of potential project emergency 
Response Measures ' situations, such as loss of well control, chemical spills, 
hydrogen sulfide exposure, pipeline rupture, fires, 
contaminated solids, etc. identifying: 
(I) technical data on the nature of the hazard (for 
example, the concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the 
various areas and the hazard associated with these 
concentrations, the corrosive characteristics of the 
abatement chemicals), or any data regarding the 
possible aerial extent of each potential emergency 
situation; 
(ii) the warning systems (such as hydrogen sulfide 
detectors) used to alert personnel of the hazard; 
(iii) the location and use of equipment used to control 
the hazard (such as fire protection equipment or 
isolation valves) or repair hazardous equipment (such 
as welding equipment or casing sleeves), and safety 
equipment for personnel (such as respiratory packs), 
including identification of the personnel trained in the 
use of that equipment; and 
(iv) provisions for the monitoring, detection, and 
inspection of wells and plant facilities for the 
prevention of emergency situations. 
e. Natural Hazards ' Provisions to address natural hazards (such as lava 
flows, earthquakes, and storms) that identify warning 
systems, control options, steps for securing and 
shutting down the facility, personnel evacuation, and 
notification to appropriate agencies; 
f. Medical Services ' The location and capabilities of available medical 
services and facilities and plans for treating and 
transporting injured persons; 
g. Evacuation ' Evacuation plans, including meeting points, personnel 
rosters, and escape routes; 
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h. Training ' Training requirements for personnel, including 
procedures for emergency shutdown, handling of 
emergency equipment, spill prevention, first aid and 
rescue, fire fighting procedures, and evacuation 
training; 
I. Drills ' Provisions for periodic emergency preparedness drills 
for personnel; 
j. Coordination with Detailed procedures to be used to facilitate 
Outside Parties ' coordination with appropriate federal, state, and 
county officials during and after any emergency 
situation; and 
k. Emergency Communication with 
Residents ' 
Procedures to be used to identify and inform all 
residents within applicable distances of the project of 
the possible emergency situations, warnings, and 
responses in advance of commencement of project 
operations and the methods by which all individuals 
affected by a given emergency will be notified and 
evacuated, as necessary. 
3.2 Guidelines for County Emergency Response Planning 
In reviewing the County of Hawai’i Emergency Operations Plan, the Review Team used 
the National Response Team’s recommended criteria for reviewing emergency response 
plans. This guidance, Criteria for Review of Hazardous Materials Emergency Plans 
(NRT-1A), serves as a supplement to the National Response Teams’s Hazardous 
Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1). The National Response Team developed 
NRT-1 and NRT-1A according to the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA). NRT requirements are summarized below in Table 4. 
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Table 4. NRT Guidance for Preparing a Hazardous Materials Emergency Plan. 
Summarized in this table are the key components of a hazardous materials emergency plan for 
local governments. The National Response Team developed this guidance to clarify the 
requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). 
Planning Elements Description 
Summary of “Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide” (NRT-1) 
a. Introduction ' The introduction includes a summary of information 
on past incidents, a promulgation document, legal 
authority and responsibility for responding, table of 
contents, abbreviations and definitions, assumptions 
and planning factors, concept of operations with 
governing principles, organizational roles and 
responsibilities, and relationship with other plans. It 
also includes instructions on plan use with purpose and 
plan distribution, and a record of plan amendments. 
EPCRA Requirements: designation of a community 
emergency coordinator and facility emergency 
coordinators, who shall make determinations necessary 
to implement the plan; methods for determining the 
occurrence of a release. 
b. Emergency Assistance Telephone 
Roster ' 
Contact names, addresses, phone numbers, and other 
pertinent information are included. 
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c. Response Functions ' Included are initial notification of response agencies, 
direction and control, communications among 
responders, warning systems and emergency public 
notification, public information and community 
relations, resource management, health and medical 
services, and response personnel safety. Also included 
are personal protection of citizens (indoor protection, 
evacuation procedures, and other public protection 
strategies), fire and rescue, law enforcement, ongoing 
incident assessment, human services, public works, 
and any other response functions that are specific to 
local conditions. 
EPCRA Requirements: methods and procedures to 
be followed by facility owners and operators and local 
emergency and medical personnel to respond to any 
releases of extremely hazardous substances; 
procedures providing reliable, effective, and timely 
notification by the facility emergency coordinators and 
the community emergency coordinator to persons 
designated in the emergency plan, and to the public, 
that a release has occurred. A description of 
emergency equipment and facilities in the community 
and at each facility in the community subject to 
EPCRA, and an identification of the persons 
responsible for such equipment and facilities. 
Evacuation plans, including provisions for a 
precautionary evacuation and alternative traffic routes. 
d. Containment and Cleanup ' Techniques for spill containment and cleanup, and 
resources for cleanup and disposal are included. 
e. Documentation and Investigative 
Follow-up ' 
Requirements, procedures and formats are included. 
f. Procedures for Testing and This includes exercises, incident review, training, 
Updating the Plan ' keeping the plan up-to-date, internal and external 
review, and plan approval. 
EPCRA Requirements: Training programs, including 
schedules for training of local emergency response and 
medical personnel. Methods and schedules for 
exercising the emergency plan. 
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g. Hazards Analysis ' A summary of hazards identification, vulnerability 
analysis, risk analysis, and facility information are 
included. 
EPCRA Requirements: methods for determining the 
area or population likely to be affected by a release of 
extremely hazardous substances; identification of 
facilities subject to EPCRA that are within the 
emergency planning district; identification of routes 
likely to be used for the transportation of substances 
on the list of extremely hazardous substances; and 
identification of additional facilities contributing or 
subjected to additional risk due to their proximity to 
facilities, such as hospitals or natural gas facilities. 
h. References ' Among the key references are laboratory, consultant, 
and other technical support resources, and a technical 
library with pertinent data bases. 
3.3 Operating Safely 
Both EPA and OSHA have recently adopted identical requirements for preventing 
accidental releases and improving safe work practices. They include the prevention 
requirements summarized below in Table 5. The prevention requirements also are 
included in the Integrated Contingency Plan guidance, known as “Oneplan,” adopted by 
the EPA, U. S. Department of Transportation, U. S. Department of the Interior, and U. S. 
Department of Labor. The “Oneplan” guidance is an optional format for facility 
emergency response planning. Both the prevention requirements and the “Oneplan” 
format are included in this report as Appendix J. 
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Table 5. Summary of Prevention Requirements. EPA and OSHA have published the 
complete text of their prevention requirements in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR). The 
citation for EPA’s prevention regulation is 40 CFR Part 68, and the citation for OSHA’s 
prevention standard is 29 CFR 1910.119. 
‚ Process Safety Information .. Identify and understand all process hazards. 
‚ Process Hazard Analysis ... Evaluate the potential for accidental releases. 
‚ Operating Procedures ....... Provide workers with clear, written instructions. 
‚ Training ............................ Teach both the hazards and safe work practices. 
‚ Mechanical Integrity .......... Use best engineering and management practices. 
‚ Management of Change ..... Understand the technical basis and effects of 
change. 
‚ Pre-startup Review ............ Confirm that construction followed the design. 
‚ Compliance Audits ............. Verify and certify compliance with standards. 
‚ Incident Investigation ......... Thoroughly analyze and resolve findings. 
‚ Employee Participation ...... Involve workers in safety management. 
‚ Hot Work Permit ............... Issue a permit for any electric or gas welding. 
‚ Contractor Safety ............... Carry out safe work practices with contractors. 
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4	 How the Review Team Evaluated 
The Emergency Response Plans 
4.1 	 General 
The primary tasks of the Review Team were to provide an independent review and 
evaluation of the emergency response plans for Puna Geothermal Venture and Hawai’i 
County. Team members focused on the longer–term objective of preventing chemical 
accidents and improving emergency response capabilities. 
4.2	 Hawai’i County Emergency Operations Plan 
The Review Team evaluated the 1989 version of the Hawai’i County Emergency 
Operations Plan. The State Civil Defense Division prepared this plan for the Hawai’i 
County Civil Defense Agency. The Review Team also evaluated a Geothermal Incident 
Standard Operating Procedure that the Administrator of the Hawai’i County Civil 
Defense Agency gave to the Team. This standard operating procedure does not show 
which department or agency is responsible for its development or when it was issued, 
except a penciled-in date of July 30, 1992. The Review Team also evaluated a two-page 
plan for an emergency response at PGV prepared by Hawai’i County Fire Department. 
4.3	 Criteria for Review of the Hawai’i County Emergency Operations Plan 
As stated earlier in Section 3.2, the Review Team used, in part, the National Response 
Team’s recommended criteria for reviewing emergency response plans. This guidance, 
Criteria for Review of Hazardous Materials Emergency Plans NRT-1A, serves as a 
supplement to the National Response Teams’s Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning 
Guide NRT-1. 
4.4	 Puna Geothermal Venture Emergency Response Plan 
The Review Team reviewed version 6.3 of the Puna Geothermal Venture Emergency 
Response Plan dated January 30, 1996, and the Puna Geothermal Venture Emergency 
Action Plan revised February 23, 1996. Review Team members also reviewed the 
HAZWOPER/Emergency Response Guidelines and Training Program, revised February 
23, 1996. 
4.5	 Criteria for Review of the PGV Emergency Response Plan 
The Review Team evaluated the PGV Emergency Response Plan following EPA 
Chemical Safety Audit Guidelines and OSHA Process Safety Management and Hazardous 
Waste Operations HAZWOPER Standards. Audit teams use Chemical Safety Audit 
Guidelines in conducting safety reviews of facilities producing and handling 
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hazardous chemicals. The Chemical Safety Audit Program, as directed by the Chemical 
Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office of EPA, is part of its Chemical Accident 
Prevention Program. The EPA has structured the Chemical Safety Audit Guidelines to 
address each of the major elements of chemical process safety management at the facility 
being audited. While no statute links the Chemical Safety Audit and EPCRA programs, 
similar goals between the two programs include: 
!  Increased preparedness for responding to accidental releases both at a facility and in a 
community; 
!  Increased awareness and understanding of chemical hazards; and 
!  Increased levels of safety practices related to producing, treating, handling, disposing, 
and transporting of hazardous substances at a facility. 
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5	 County of Hawai’i 
Emergency Operations Plan 
5.1 	 General 
This section covers the Review Team’s assessment of the Hawai’i County Emergency 
Operations Plan, from now on called the “Plan.” The Review Team presents findings and 
recommendations for the Plan, including the Basic Plan and Annexes. 
The Plan is a multiple hazards plan that “is designed to provide guidance to emergency 
managers to cope with every possible type of hazard—natural, technological and war.” A 
primary focus of the Plan is preparedness and emergency response to floods, volcanic 
activity, earthquakes, tsunami, drought, and fire. It also integrates emergency response 
capabilities along functional lines. 
The Plan covers transportation and industrial accidents, utility failures, and pollution 
including marine oil spills and accidents involving oil and hazardous substances. It also 
covers health, including epidemics and infestations, and major public disorder and unrest. 
All of these are called “human-caused” disasters. Annexes to the Plan present more detail 
on emergency response procedures for utility failures, oil and hazardous substance 
accidents, and health hazards. The Plan lists the other human-caused disasters for 
reference only. It states that such disasters could occur more frequently if the 
urbanization, tourism and economy of the County continue to expand. 
The Plan covers human-caused spills and releases of hazardous substances as disasters if 
the destructive event is great in size and scope. This would justify carrying out as much of 
the organization and response portion of the Plan as the County determines is necessary. 
The Plan presents an “Oil and Hazardous Substances Response Plan” in Annex M. 
Specifically, Annex M addresses emergency response to spills and releases of hazardous 
substances. 
The Plan provides a basis for emergency managers of government agencies and private 
organizations to develop internal preparedness and response procedures. Each county 
agency is responsible for developing and maintaining disaster response plans, Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs), or checklists in support and conformance with the Plan. 
The State Civil Defense Division prepared the Plan for the Hawai’i County Civil Defense 
Agency. The Hawai’i State Director of Civil Defense and the Mayor of Hawai’i County, 
also serving as a State Deputy Director of Civil Defense, signed the Plan on March 8, 
1990. Hawai’i County distributed copies of the Plan to all cooperating agencies and 
offices in local, state, and federal government. Notably, they included the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency Region IX - San Francisco in the distribution list. As of 
August 1996, the State and County had made no revisions to the Plan from the date of 
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approval, as recorded on the page provided for this purpose. 
5.2 Basic Plan 
Hawai’i County Emergency Operations Plan includes a Plan for Emergency Preparedness. 
This Basic Plan defines the purpose, scope, authority, and organization for a governmental 
or private sector response in the County. Section III of the Basic Plan also defines the 
responsibilities and functions of the County, State and Federal departments, agencies, and 
offices, and other supporting organizations. 
Section IV of the Basic Plan describes emergency procedures during disasters and 
coordinating instructions. Included is a description of response plans that each County 
department, agency and office, and State district and branch office will develop, including 
an annual update. Each agency will ensure that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or 
checklists include complete, understandable instructions for carrying out and coordinating 
activities under emergency conditions. Appendix I to the Basic Plan contains a sample of 
the disaster response checklist. 
Section V “Direction and Control” includes paragraphs that describe the organizational 
structure and role of the County Civil Defense Agency. This agency and its administrator 
are responsible for promptly and efficiently carrying out the County Emergency 
Operations Plan. This includes the review and coordination of supporting plans developed 
by governmental and private agencies in the County. Section V also describes the 
responsibilities of the head of each County and State department, agency, and office. This 
section covers warning and evacuation, access to disaster areas, communications, reports 
and reporting, damage assessment, public information, training tests and drills, no-fault 
coverage and effective date. 
Section VI “Readiness Evaluation” describes a State and County Civil Defense assistance 
program for reviewing response plans (including operating procedures, checklists, and 
agreements). This program aids County departments and agencies, State district and 
branch offices, and private organizations in identifying and correcting deficiencies. Also, 
the assistance program helps to conduct emergency training exercises and critiques, 
participate in post disaster critiques and evaluations, and program and budget for 
operating requirements and improvements. If a County department or agency was not 
complying with provisions of the Basic Plan, the County Civil Defense Administrator 
would prepare a disaster readiness evaluation. The Administrator would cite the agency 
as delinquent in the evaluation and include these findings in a periodic report to the State 
Deputy Director of Civil Defense. 
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5.3 Annexes 
5.3.1 Annex A: County of Hawai’i Disaster Response Organization 
The organization chart in Annex A identifies the Hawai’i County Civil Defense 
Agency as the lead agency in a disaster. During a disaster response, this agency 
has command and control responsibility for the activities of the police and fire 
departments. The chart also defines the organizational responsibilities and 
relationships between county and state departments, agencies and offices in 
providing support to the Hawai’i County Civil Defense Agency. The chart does 
not show a role for a site incident commander or on-scene coordinator. In the role 
of State Deputy Director of Civil Defense, the Hawai’i County Mayor is ultimately 
responsible for disaster response preparedness and the performance of the Hawai’i 
County Civil Defense Agency. 
5.3.2 Annex B: Hazards Analysis 
In Annex B, Hazards Analysis, the authors of the Plan recognize that a thorough 
analysis of all hazards is fundamental to all effective disaster preparedness and 
response plans. Annex B includes accidental release of hazardous substances as 
human-caused hazards. Accordingly, an industrial accident like a release of H2S at 
Puna Geothermal Venture is a human-caused emergency when it seriously 
threatens the loss of life or damage to property. Annex B, Section II, “Types of 
Hazards,” lists human-caused hazards separately from natural disasters. The 
authors make this distinction because human-caused hazards can occur more 
frequently and develop suddenly and unexpectedly. They require a prompt, 
effective and coordinated response to protect lives and property. 
While Annex B includes accidental releases of hazardous substances as 
human–made hazards, it does not address such releases as a threat to the public 
and the environment. The authors have not listed this category in Section III 
“Vulnerability.” 
5.3.3 Annex C: Warning and Evacuation 
Annex C describes the County disaster warning system and the responsibilities and 
functions of the Hawai’i Civil Defense Agency in coordinating a disaster warning. 
The County Civil Defense Administrator may direct an agency to sound an 
Attention/Alert siren when a local disaster threatens the immediate welfare of the 
County. An announcement over the radio and television will accompany the 
Attention/Alert signal using the local Emergency Broadcast System. 
Section III A of Annex C describes the actions citizens should take when they hear 
an Attention/Alert siren. The actions include tuning a radio to any local station, 
listening for emergency information and instructions, and taking 
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necessary protective actions as directed. Information in Appendix 4 “Hazards” is 
inconsistent with “Warning Time” information in Section III, based on discussions 
with Mr. Harry Kim. According to Appendix 4, the County will notify the 
‘community’ at risk. Section III describes the Emergency Siren Signal system that 
provides warnings throughout the county. 
While this warning system is set up to alert the public of natural hazards that have 
warning time, they recognize that some hazards will occur with no warning. 
Appendix 3 to Annex C lists such hazards: local tsunamis, flash floods, water 
spout tornados, and earthquakes. In an urgent local tsunami warning, the Central 
Police Dispatch (County Warning Point) in Hilo has the authority to sound the 
Attention/Alert signal immediately. 
Notably, the list of hazards also includes human-induced events that could be 
catastrophic to the community. Any of these hazards could result in a sudden 
unexpected effect with little time for official warning: explosions, fires, and 
transportation or industrial accidents. Appendix C does not specify whether the 
County has extended an urgent alerting authority to the Central Police Dispatch for 
other hazards that may occur with little warning time. 
5.3.4 Annex D: Civil Defense 
Annex D clearly describes the County of Hawai’i Civil Defense Agency and the 
organizational structure of its Emergency Operating Center. Appendix 1 to Annex 
D is a guide to the disaster communications capability of the organization. This 
guide lists the participating agencies and how a basic radio communication system 
links them. The guide also includes a list of commercial radio stations that would 
broadcast emergency bulletins from the Civil Defense Agency. The organizational 
structure does not include a list of people the County would notify by telephone. 
5.3.5 Annex M: Oil and Hazardous Substances Response Plan 
Annex M “Oil and Hazardous Substances Response Plan” states the following -­
“Proper handling of a hazardous material emergency requires that certain 
information pertaining to the released material be obtained before any 
personnel or public are exposed during a subsequent effort to mitigate the 
emergency. The listing of these materials and information is attached to 
each individual facility appendix of this Annex.” 
However, the Review Team found no such appendices attached to Annex M. 
Annex M does not contain a list or any information about hazardous substances in 
the PGV facility. Also, it does not describe any public or environmental threats 
that could result from a serious release of hazardous substances. 
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5.4 Geothermal Incident Standard Operating Procedure 
The Basic Plan requires police, fire and other emergency support organizations to include 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for warning and evacuating residents. Emergency 
response organizations have prepared a Geothermal Incident SOP for a major H2S release 
from the PGV facility. The SOP is a checklist of tasks and responsibilities the emergency 
managers use when Hawai’i County opens its Emergency Operations Center. Police, Fire, 
Health, and Public Works departments, and the Red Cross use their SOP for notifying the 
public of any threat from a geothermal hazard. 
The Geothermal Incident SOP dated July 30, 1992 does not describe how to do the tasks, 
nor does it provide clear definitions of responsibilities and duties. For example, the SOP 
shows that a task of the Emergency Operations Center is to direct the response operations 
and to establish an On-Scene Coordinator. The main tasks of the On-Scene Coordinator 
are to (1) establish communications with the Emergency Operations Center, responding 
agencies, and the community, (2) prepare a hazard assessment, and (3) coordinate the 
response, including warning and notification, evacuation, and securement. The SOP splits 
the management functions of directing and coordinating between the Emergency 
Operations Center and the On-Scene Coordinator, leaving uncertainties about who is in 
full command. We note that the On-Scene Coordinator described above should not be 
confused with a predesignated federal official. The federal official coordinates federal 
activities at a hazardous material incident and monitors the incident for compliance with 
federal pollution control laws. 
The Geothermal Incident SOP does not describe any likely geothermal incidents for which 
the plan is directed. The SOP identifies PGV as a location of direct impact and includes a 
table with H2S release scenarios that have the PGV facility as a source. The SOP does not 
describe any response actions the County and local responders would take in the PGV 
facility. It does not mention coordinated preparedness among the County, local 
responders and PGV. 
5.5 Findings and Recommendations 
5.5.1 Finding: 
The Basic Plan clearly states its purpose to achieve effective governmental and 
private sector preparedness for prompt, fully coordinated, flexible response and 
assistance when natural, human-caused disaster or acts of war threaten or occur 
anywhere in the County of Hawai’i. As reflected in this statement and throughout 
the plan, little recognition or attention to “chemical” or “industrial” issues occurs. 
Annex M, the Oil and Hazardous Substances Response Plan, is underdeveloped 
considering the island’s continuing economic growth. 
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Recommendation: 
The County Department of Civil Defense should review and revise the Hawai’i 
Emergency Operations Plan to update and replace the 1989 Plan. They should 
update the Plan in cooperation with all County agencies, local code enforcement 
and emergency response departments and other interested parties. The basic Oil 
and Hazardous Substances Response Plan, as described in Annex M, is not a plan 
for field operations. The Plan should describe the relationship between Federal, 
State and local response plans for hazardous materials. This document should 
contain three parts: basic plan, local jurisdiction information, and pertinent source 
material. 
Part I- the basic Oil and Hazardous Substances Response Plan (Annex M) should 
provide the framework to bring together, in one place, information describing the 
elements of hazardous materials incident planning and response in the County of 
Hawai’i including: 
a. Establishing roles and responsibilities for government agency actions required 
to protect life, the environment and property from the effects of any hazardous 
materials release or threatened release that impacts any part of the County of 
Hawai’i; 
b. Identifying procedures Hawai’i County will use to coordinate the management 
of hazardous materials emergency response; 
c. Meeting the requirements for the County that also carry out the requirements 
for the State of Hawai’i; 
d. Substantially addressing each element listed in the SARA Title III and in the 
Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT–1) issued by the National 
Emergency Response Team. Objectives include the following: 
1. Providing guidance to those required to provide services in case of a hazardous 
materials incident; 
2. Describing pre–emergency preparations, concept of operations, organization, 
incident command, protective actions, and supporting systems required to carry 
out the plan; 
3. Defining responsibilities and functions of each participating organization, public 
or private; and 
4. Establishing lines of authority and coordination. 
Part II- Each lead agency with planning and response roles should provide local 
jurisdiction information. Local jurisdictions should provide information for the 
following: 
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a. An information sheet with contacts; 
b. A narrative report describing local capabilities and resources; and 
c. Supplemental information showing assigned responsibilities. 
Part III- Appendices should include, at a minimum, references to all source 
documents that provide the foundation for the basic Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Response Plan (Annex M) including: 
a. County and Operational Plan; 
b. Local Police and Fire Service; 
c. County Central Fire Protection District Hazardous Materials Operations Guide; 
and 
d. PGV Emergency Response Plan. 
5.5.2 Finding: 
While the Basic Plan mentions ‘private sector’ assistance, this is not well defined 
for the role of facilities that may experience hazardous materials accidents. Many 
organizational graphics (see Annex D-1) do not include assistance from the 
private sector. 
Recommendation: 
Planners should address and define the role of facility personnel if facility chemical 
emergencies are to be coordinated with the county plan. They should also specify 
how, when, and under what conditions facility (private sector) personnel would 
interface with other authorities. Concerning the Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Response Plan (Annex M), EPCRA laws require the designation of a community 
emergency coordinator and facility emergency coordinators who will make 
determinations necessary to implement the plan. 
5.5.3 Finding: 
Annex C, Section III, Civil Defense Siren Signals and Appendix 4, Hazards with 
Warning Time are inconsistent based on discussions with Mr. Harry Kim. While 
the Emergency Siren System described in Section III provides warnings 
throughout the county, Appendix 4 says they will notify the ‘community’ at risk. 
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Recommendation: 
Emergency managers have found many ways to alert and notify the community 
when a human-made disaster affects only the area local to the source. Below are 
some ways that Hawai’i County working with PGV could improve their alerting 
and notifying: 
!  Both Hawai’i County and PGV should explore the technical and economic 
feasibility of upgrading the system. The upgrade should include the capability to 
provide alerts within a single community (such as Pahoa or Hilo) without 
unnecessarily alerting the entire island. This would allow them to use the system 
as Annex C, Appendix 4 intends — the notification of a specific community at risk; 
!  Install tone-alert radios that a Radio Broadcast Data System (RBDS) signal 
could activate in the homes surrounding PGV or where sensitive population 
centers exist (e.g., schools, hospitals, day care centers); 
!  Use a telephone call-down system, which can make many telephone calls 
simultaneously, to get emergency information to the community; 
!  When sirens are sounded, in response to an accidental release of a hazardous 
material, use the existing connections with the television and radio stations to 
notify the public what is occurring and protective actions they should to take; and 
!  Educate the public on how to “shelter-in-place” and turn on their radios or 
televisions to receive instructions on the appropriate protective action, when a they 
hear a siren. With some modifications to the Hawai’i County systems, they could 
provide an excellent means of alerting and notifying the community surrounding 
the PGV facility. The County could also instruct the public about what actions 
they should take during an emergency. 
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5.5.4 Finding: 
Some hazards will occur with almost no warning time. Appendix 3 to Annex C 
lists local tsunami, flash floods, water spout tornado, and earthquake as such 
hazards. Notably, the list of hazards also includes human-induced events that 
could be catastrophic to the community. Any of these hazards could result in a 
sudden unexpected effect with little time for official warning: explosions, fires, 
and transportation or industrial accidents. In an urgent local tsunami warning, the 
Central Police Dispatch (County Warning Point) in Hilo has the authority to sound 
the Attention/Alert signal immediately. Appendix C does not specify whether the 
County has extended an urgent alerting authority to the Central Police Dispatch for 
other hazards that may occur with little warning. 
Recommendation: 
The Plan should include a procedure allowing the Pahoa Substation of the Hawai’i 
County Fire Department to make emergency decisions, such as sounding sirens. 
The Pahoa Substation could then manage the emergency until personnel from 
Hawai’i County Civil Defense have time to arrive and take command. This could 
shorten the time needed to alert and notify the public after a release. 
Hawai’i County Civil Defense, the Pahoa Substation, PGV, and representatives of 
the community should work together and determine how they will manage an 
accidental release. This could include setting up different levels of incidents. This 
group could also determine the appropriate response for each level of incident and 
when to notify Civil Defense, the Pahoa Substation, and the community. 
5.5.5 Finding: 
Annex M, Section I “Overview” does not address public or environmental threats 
caused by a serious release of hazardous substances from a facility. The appendix 
listing hazardous materials for individual facilities is also missing. 
Recommendation: 
Puna Geothermal Venture and other facilities in Hawai’i County that handle 
hazardous materials should submit information on all hazardous substances as 
required by EPCRA. In addition, each facility should prepare a hazards analysis 
including a worst-case scenario and off-site consequence analysis. If the hazards 
analysis shows a serious threat to the public and the environment, the County 
should list it in Annex B, Hazards Analysis, Section III - Vulnerability. The 
County also should address it in Annex M “Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Response Plan.” 
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In September 1998, Hawai’i County Civil Defense Agency informed EPA that 
each individual facility appendix is available on the Hawai’i County Fire 
Department computer. A paper copy is also located at the Civil Defense 
emergency operations center, but it should be updated. These appendices are 
commonly referred to as the “individual facility profiles for SARA Title III.” 
5.5.6 Finding: 
Annex M, Section III, Concept of Operations (Step C) states that "the Chief of the 
Hawai’i Fire Department, or his designee, assumes the role of Incident 
Commander until relieved by the Hawai’i County Civil Defense Agency upon 
activation of County of Hawai’i Emergency Operations Plan." However, the 
emergency response plans for Puna Geothermal Venture designate facility 
personnel to fill the role of incident commander. Thus, the county and facility 
plans are inconsistent. 
Recommendation: 
PGV and County personnel should jointly assess the emergency and the necessary 
response activities. PGV personnel will better understand the response level 
required within the plant boundaries. However, the County agencies should also 
assess the emergency, as PGV may call them to provide backup for personnel 
rescue, medical assistance and fire fighting within the plant boundaries. 
Additionally, the County agencies should decide the need for offsite evacuations. 
Refer to the recommendations in Section 4.2.4. 
5.5.7 Finding: 
In Annex M, Section VII, Warning and Evacuation, the County determines the 
evacuation area based on information from the computer program CAMEO 
(Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations). They do not define the 
parties responsible for modeling in the procedure. Additionally, they do not define 
procedures for obtaining necessary input variables to run the computer program. 
Variables include industrial process and meteorological information that should be 
available quickly. 
For planning purposes, PGV has prepared advanced modeling of anticipated worst 
case release scenarios for H2S and effects from pentane fires. This information is 
presented in the Plan. The models show no life threatening effects at the nearest 
residential location, which is approximately 2,000 feet. However, the public is 
concerned about model accuracy. One local resident stated that during a blowout, 
concentrations of 30 parts per million (ppm) were present at the resident’s home, 
but the PGV models predicted only 1.1 ppm. The EPA has not confirmed the 
PGV model accuracy or the resident’s statement. 
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Recommendation: 
a. Identify a responder responsible for CAMEO modeling and identify where to 
obtain meteorological input data. Identify a PGV source to provide release 
information. This procedural information may be better placed in the Hawai’i 
County Fire Department plan for Emergency Response to Puna Geothermal 
Venture. The County Emergency Operations Plan is more general in nature. 
b. Hawai’i County (with support from EPA) should confirm PGV model 
accuracy, determining if PGV’s input is appropriate and if the model results are 
reasonable. Additionally, Hawai’i County and PGV should evaluate other hazard 
scenarios. One example of a hazard scenario is the failure of caustic injection at 
the Emergency Steam Release Facility when this facility experiences maximum 
flow. Another example is the effect of discharges from pressure relief valves on 
the pentane, steam, and process sides of the operation. The “process” at PGV, as 
defined by Process Safety Management (29 CFR 1910.119), includes the pentane, 
steam, and condensate systems, as they are all interconnected by pipeline. 
5.5.8 Finding: 
Annex M, Section VII, Warning and Evacuation says that each facility appendix 
lists individual evacuation plans. The Review Team did not see a facility appendix 
for PGV. Additionally, the public has raised several concerns related to 
evacuation: 
a. They do not know where to evacuate. 
b. They do not know how the County will notify them of an evacuation. 
c. Residents southwest of PGV are concerned that their only evacuation route is 
toward the facility, and that electric power transmission lines run along this road. 
For example, the power lines could fall onto the road during a major earthquake, 
and this same earthquake could also cause a major accidental release from PGV. 
If the release required an evacuation, and the only evacuation route was 
impassable, residents would be at risk of injury. 
d. They are concerned about housing for evacuees. 
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e. They state that too few (only two) buses are available for evacuating children 
from school in Pahoa. They do not know how the County will notify the school of 
an evacuation. 
f. They are concerned about the County Civil Defense's ability to notify the 
residents in the adjacent housing if they need to evacuate quickly. 
Recommendation: 
a. Initially, the local responders and PGV should resolve all coordination issues 
identified previously in these findings and recommendations. 
b. After Hawai’i County, with EPA support, confirms release scenario models, 
local responders should define public evacuation routes and safe congregation 
areas. Although maps show releases as circles concentric to the release point, the 
actual release will take the shape of a plume. Consequently, local responders 
should define alternate evacuation routes considering different wind directions. 
c. A plan to evacuate the schools at the Pahoa K-12 complex should be in place. 
If too few buses are available, perhaps the County should consider using private 
vehicles. Local responders should also work with the schools to develop an 
emergency plan which includes shelter–in–place procedures. 
d. Local responders should develop a plan to ensure the public follows proper 
evacuation routes and that they reduce traffic congestion. 
e. The County should publish additional information in the individual facility 
appendix of Annex M addressing -- (1) indoor protection and (2) the evacuation 
procedures detailed in Function 9, Page 56 of the NRT–1 guidance. Evacuation 
procedures should address housing for evacuees. 
f. The local responders should review the evacuation plan with the public and 
consider public participation to the plan. 
5.5.9 Finding: 
Annex M, Section X –Training provides little information beyond the County’s 
intent to provide training. 
Recommendation: 
Annex M, Section X –The County should develop training for hazardous materials 
response to include both frequency of delivery (a schedule) and emphasis on joint 
activities with private sector facility personnel. Joint training is vital for addressing 
and exercising the interface mechanisms (cited above) which 
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avoid confusion in real-world events. 
5.5.10 Finding 
The State Department of Civil Defense prepared the Hawai’i County Emergency 
Operations Plan for the County of Hawai’i. On March 8, 1990, the Mayor of the 
County (who is also the State Deputy Director of Civil Defense) and the Director 
of Hawai’i State Civil Defense signed the Plan. The document as signed was 
incomplete. However, they have made no revisions to the Plan since the date of 
acceptance. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U. 
S. C. § 11003 (1995), states that each local emergency planning committee 
(LEPC) “shall review such plan once a year, or more frequently as changed 
circumstances in the community or at any facility may require.” 
Recommendation: 
Hawai’i County should review, update, and complete the Plan, including SOPs. 
The Review Team suggests that the County refer to the Hazardous Materials 
Emergency Planning Guide, document NRT-1, and the Criteria for Review of 
Hazardous Materials Emergency Plans, document NRT-1A. The National 
Response Team prepared both documents as guides for reviewing and updating 
emergency response plans. 
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6	 Puna Geothermal Venture 
Emergency Response Plan 
6.1 	 General 
The PGV Emergency Response Plan and other facility documents describe some pertinent 
types of incidents and who will be contacted during an incident. The Emergency 
Response Plan describes who will be the Incident Commander during certain times. The 
only person specified as the Incident Commander is the Site Manager or the Operations 
and Maintenance Manager “if pre-qualified.” The Emergency Response Plan designates 
the Incident Commander as the person responsible for confirming that PGV notifies all 
agencies and others quickly. 
The Emergency Response Plan includes several different release scenarios. Some of these 
scenarios involve hydrogen sulfide, diesel fuel, pentane, brine and steam. OSHA Process 
Safety Management (PSM), 20 CFR 1910.119, requires regulated facilities to take steps 
to prevent or minimize the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive, 
flammable or explosive chemicals. PGV is subject to this regulation because it handles 
pentane, which is a flammable substance. Among the requirements of PSM are emergency 
planning and response. 
PGV addresses emergency response in the following several documents: the Emergency 
Response Plan, Version 6.3, dated February 1, 1996 and referenced as ERP below; the 
HAZWOPER/Emergency Response Guidelines and Training Program, revised February 
23, 1996 and referenced as HAZWOPER below; and the PGV Emergency Action Plan and 
Notification Guidelines, revised February 23, 1996 and referenced as EAP below. Under 
federal requirements for hazardous waste operations and emergency response 
(HAZWOPER) 29 CFR 1910.120, the emergency response plan is required to address, 
"Pre-emergency planning and coordination with outside parties.” All emergency response 
plans list County Civil Defense and other non-PGV responders on the external call list. 
The Review Team noted that these plans appeared to lack several emergency response 
requirements as mandated by OSHA. Although EPA is not asserting responsibility for 
enforcing OSHA requirements, these findings and recommendations for correcting the 
deficiencies include specific regulatory references. 
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6.2 Employee Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention Plans — 29 CFR 1910.38 
6.2.1 Finding: 
Under 1910.38(a)(2)(ii), the plan is required to include, "Procedures to be 
followed by employees who remain to operate critical plant operations before they 
evacuate." PGV notes equipment removal activities in case of a natural hazard in 
Table 5-1 of the ERP. Due to time constraints, the Review Team scanned the 
procedures in the emergency response documents. The Operations and 
Maintenance Manual table of contents did not state clearly whether emergency 
shutdown procedures do exist. 
Recommendation: 
PGV should have emergency shutdown procedures. If these procedures exist 
already, PGV should cross-reference the procedures for an emergency shutdown 
with its emergency response procedures. [Please note: the Review Team was not 
given the opportunity to review the PGV Operations Manual, and EPA did not 
receive a copy for review. HIOSH informed EPA during a teleconference 
November 3, 1999, that HIOSH is satisfied with the written emergency shut down 
procedures in PGV’s emergency response plan.] 
6.2.2 Finding: 
Under 1910.38(a)(2)(iv), the plan is required to include, "Rescue and medical 
duties for those employees who are to perform them." The ERP states that at least 
three people with first aid training will work on every shift. At the time of the 
review, it was not clear in any emergency response document how the facility 
identified individuals with first aid training during an emergency or what their role 
was on the response team. PGV has since indicated to EPA that all PGV 
employees are certified for first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation or CPR. 
Recommendation: 
The emergency response procedures should clarify the role of first aid responders 
to ensure they are available to administer first aid when required. 
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6.3 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response — 29 CFR 1910.120 
6.3.1 Finding: 
Under 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(2)(I), the emergency response plan is required to 
address, “pre-emergency planning and coordination with outside parties.” From 
discussions with County Civil Defense and local responders, the Review Team 
found that coordination with outside parties is practically nonexistent. The 
emergency response plans do not address responders’ roles or coordination of 
response activities with local responders. At the time of this review, PGV's stated 
position was that it will handle all incidents internally in its facility, except fire 
incidents. Insufficient coordination with outside parties is the primary cause of 
concern over PGV’s need to improve its emergency response capability. Some of 
the specific concerns are described below, in paragraphs 6.3.2 through 6.3.6. 
Recommendation: 
PGV should improve its emergency response capability by -­
1. Clarifying in writing the local responder responsibilities and 
2. Communicating with outside parties during pre-emergency planning. 
PGV responders may need backup from the Hawai’i County Fire Department and 
its HAZMAT, hazardous materials, or EMT, emergency medical technician, teams. 
A facility emergency could include a fire, explosion, hazardous substance release, 
or all three at the same time, in which case PGV could become overwhelmed. 
Given a very serious emergency, local responders may need to rescue PGV 
responders. 
6.3.2 Finding: 
The Hawai’i County Fire Department and its HAZMAT team members said they 
were uncertain what their role would be in an emergency response at PGV. The 
assistant fire chief also stated that he would not send County responders beyond 
the plant boundary without understanding the facility and the County’s role in the 
response. PGV personnel noted that they do not expect the fire department to 
respond to releases of hazardous substances in their facility. However, PGV 
would call Hawai’i County Fire Department for assistance if it had a fire in its 
facility. For example, if the pentane cycle or any component of the entirely closed 
cycle caught fire, PGV would call the fire department. 
      August, 2000 Final Report - 43 
Recommendation: 
PGV should work with the Hawai’i County Fire Department to refine the Fire 
Department’s procedure entitled, "Emergency Response to Puna Geothermal 
Venture." The Fire Department should incorporate the response of its newly 
formed HAZMAT team. Also, PGV should work with the Fire Department to 
clearly define the possible response scenarios, both inside and outside the plant 
boundaries. Some of these scenarios involve hydrogen sulfide, caustic soda, diesel 
fuel, pentane, brine and steam. If other hazardous chemicals are present in the 
steam from geothermal wells, the Emergency Response Plan should include them 
as well. EPA notes that specific conditions render chemicals hazardous rather than 
their presence alone. Defining these scenarios and the anticipated level of backup 
from the Fire Department and the HAZMAT team will require PGV participation. 
PGV should work with Hawai’i County Civil Defense Agency and Fire 
Department, Pahoa Substation, to establish how and whom PGV will notify during 
an incident. For example, a situation could arise in which PGV personnel are 
injured during an emergency response, and PGV would need to call County Fire 
for rescue or backup. PGV and the County should address emergencies involving 
both hazardous materials and fire in the facility. 
6.3.3 Finding: 
Version 6.3 of the Emergency Response Plan states that the County “Civil Defense 
Agency has the responsibility of providing the warning to, and to effect the 
implementation of, the evacuation of any residents or other members of the public 
from the appropriate hazard area surrounding the site, as necessary.” However, 
this plan does not clearly state the order in which PGV personnel should notify 
County responders. The lack of clarity may cause a delay in County response, 
such as evacuation, that could have serious consequences. PGV does not address 
pre-emergency response planning activities with outside parties, e.g. the 
community, in any planning document. 
Version 6.3 of PGV’s Plan states that “PGV anticipates no project-created 
situation which would not provide sufficient time for the Civil Defense Agency to 
warn or evacuate the public, as appropriate.” PGV’s release history does not 
support this statement. In the past, incidents have occurred quickly and without 
sufficient warning to notify or evacuate the public before they were exposed to 
hazardous substances. According to the County Civil Defense Administrator, 
incidents also have occurred in which neighbors to PGV phoned-in complaints of 
H2S releases, and PGV did not report these same releases. Copies of letters 
between EPA and PGV regarding one such release in January, 2000 are appended 
to the final report. 
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Recommendation: 
With PGV’s assistance, Hawai’i County Fire Department personnel should 
evaluate and determine if release or fire situations require outside response. The 
State of Hawai’i has adopted the 1988 edition of the Uniform Fire Code by 
reference into its State Model Fire Code. The Uniform Fire Code section 10.101 
authorizes the County Fire Department to direct an operation as necessary at the 
scene of a fire or other emergency involving the protection of life or property. 
Section 10.101 also empowers the County Fire Department to perform any rescue 
operation or take any other action necessary in the reasonable performance of its 
duty. Both PGV and Hawai’i County Fire Department have emergency response 
capabilities and responsibilities. PGV should improve its coordination with outside 
parties and its outreach activities. PGV should involve both local responders and 
the community in its pre-emergency planning. 
6.3.4 Finding: 
This finding pertains only to hazardous materials releases. By not incorporating 
the ranking outside responder into the Incident Command System (ICS) for 
hazmat response, PGV is directly or indirectly making decisions that affect outside 
emergency response personnel and the public. For example, PGV will define the 
severity of an accidental release scenario or the potential severity of the release. 
Then the outside responders will base their action on the PGV assessment. 
Recommendation: 
PGV and Hawai’i County should modify the PGV Emergency Response Plan and 
the Hawai’i County Emergency Operations Plan to coordinate a joint incident 
command system. Both a PGV official and the ranking outside responder should 
share the responsibility for incident command. The PGV Emergency Response 
Plan should clarify that the PGV control room operator will serve as the Incident 
Commander during every shift, including off-hours, until relieved by the 
Operations and Maintenance Manager or Site Manager. 
6.3.5 Finding: 
The Review Team was not able to review and determine if PGV had conducted a 
thorough process hazards analysis (PHA), such as a hazard and operability study, 
for the entire PGV facility. As of August 1996, PGV had not reviewed its PHA on 
well blowouts and pentane fires with outside responders. Thus, they may not have 
identified emergencies beyond well blowouts and pentane fires that could require 
outside emergency response. EPA takes notice of PGV’s more recent efforts to 
work with response agencies and its willingness to share process hazards analyses. 
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Recommendation: 
PGV should continue to review the results of its PHAs with outside responders to 
identify the hazards that may require outside emergency response. 
6.3.6 Finding: 
Under 1910.120(q)(2)(viii), the emergency response plan should address, 
"Emergency medical treatment and first aid." The ERP discusses first aid but does 
not clarify the coordination with outside responders to provide emergency medical 
treatment. 
Recommendation: 
PGV should address medical treatment beyond first aid, such as acute exposure to 
H2S and severe burns. PGV also should identify offsite responders and the 
hospital in Hilo that can handle such emergencies. EPA has discussed this issue 
with HIOSH and takes note that PGV has made improvements since the Review 
Team’s site visit in 1996. 
6.3.7 Finding: 
Under 1910.120(q)(2)(iii), the emergency response plan is required to address, 
"Emergency Recognition and Prevention." The ERP discusses recognition of an 
H2S emergency. However, it does not discuss recognition of combustible gas 
leaks and fires in any of the emergency response procedures. The ERP references 
pentane leak rupture and fire in the Operations and Maintenance Procedures, but 
PGV did not make these procedures accessible to the Review Team. Thus, the 
Review Team cannot comment on the content. The Operations Manager advised 
the Review Team that as of August 1996, PGV was developing the emergency 
procedure for fire. 
Recommendation: 
If PGV addresses combustible gas leaks and fires somewhere, then it should either 
incorporate them into the emergency response procedures or cross-reference them. 
If PGV has not addressed gas leaks and fires, it should incorporate them into the 
ERP or EAP. 
6.3.8 Finding: 
Under 1910.120(q)(3)(I), "The senior emergency response official responding to 
an emergency shall become the individual in charge of a site-specific Incident 
Command System (ICS)." 
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Recommendation: 
PGV and the local Fire Department’s HAZMAT Team should consider the Joint 
Incident Command System for a coordinated emergency response. Both parties 
should formalize the joint command structure so everyone will know who is 
responsible for all tasks. 
6.3.9 Finding: 
Under 1910.120(q)(3)(v), "The individual in charge of the ICS shall limit the 
number of emergency response personnel at the emergency site, in those areas of 
potential or actual exposure to incident or site hazards, to those who are actively 
performing emergency operations. However, operations in hazardous areas shall 
be performed using the buddy system in groups of two or more." HAZWOPER 
discusses control zones, but at the time of this review in August 1996, none of the 
emergency response plans addressed control of the number of personnel or use of 
the buddy system. 
Recommendation: 
In its ERP or EAP, PGV should include a discussion of using the buddy system 
and controlling the number of response personnel. This should also be included in 
PGV’s Annual Safety Training Program which is in Section 6 of the ERP. 
6.3.10 Finding: 
Under 1910.120(q)(3)(viii), "When activities are judged by the safety official to be 
an Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) condition and/or involve an 
imminent danger condition, the safety official shall have the authority to alter, 
suspend, or terminate those activities." The PGV emergency response plan does 
not give this authority to the safety officer. 
Recommendation: 
PGV should provide this authority to the safety officer or provide some type of 
check support to the incident commander's authority. PGV should add a clear 
statement of authority or check support to its ERP. The term “check support” 
means a system of checks and balances on the authority of the incident 
commander. 
6.3.11 Finding: 
Under 1910.120(q)(4), “temporary employees who are needed to perform work on 
an emergency basis, such as operating cranes or earth moving equipment, are not 
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required to be trained in the emergency response plans, but should be briefed in the 
hazards, proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to be used and the duties to 
be performed.” This issue is not addressed in the emergency response plans. 
Recommendation: 
PGV should amend the ERP to satisfy this requirement. 
6.3.12 Finding: 
Under 1910.120(q)(10), “chemical protective clothing used for emergency 
response shall meet the requirements of 1910.120(g)(3-5).” Personnel protective 
equipment (PPE) and clothing available for emergency response are listed in 
HAZWOPER and the EAP. PGV’s plans do not discuss what type of clothing and 
PPE its personnel will use for different types of emergency response. 
Recommendation: 
PGV should clarify what appropriate clothing and protective equipment its 
personnel will use for different response activities. 
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7 Overarching Issues 
7.1 General 
Although the focus of this review was evaluating the emergency response capabilities of 
Hawai’i County and PGV, the Review Team did discover some issues and concerns that 
related to emergency response but were outside the reviewers’ fields of expertise. Review 
Team members also learned about other important emergency planning issues of 
overlapping responsibility among PGV, Hawai’i County, and the State of Hawai’i. These 
overarching issues are presented in this final section of the report because the issues are 
important and relevant to emergency planning and response. The Review Team suggests 
that all parties work together to resolve each issue. 
7.2 Findings and Recommendations 
7.2.1 Finding: 
In 1991, the State of Hawai’i Department of Health (HDOH) identified levels of 
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) that emergency managers could use for alert, warning, and 
emergency levels of H2S in the air. The alert level is 10 ppb H2S averaged over a 
24-hour period, the warning level is 100 ppb averaged over a one-hour period, and 
the emergency level is 1,000 ppb averaged over a one-hour period. 
Emergency managers at Hawai’i County and PGV also have identified H2S levels. 
Hawai’i County has identified the 1,000 ppb level averaged over a one-hour period 
as an evacuation trigger. In its ERP, PGV has listed a watch level of 25 ppb 
averaged over a one-hour period and a warning level of 1,000 ppb averaged over a 
one-hour period. 
The Review Team found that the stationary H2S air monitoring network around 
PGV’s perimeter is currently not set to measure ambient H2S levels greater than 
500 ppb. HDOH and PGV operate stationary monitors around the PGV 
perimeter, which are set to monitor from 0 to 500 ppb1 . The monitors are capable 
of measuring different ranges, up to 20 ppm or 20,000 ppb, if recalibrated. 
Because the monitors are currently set to measure from 0 to 500 ppb, the 
stationary H2S air monitoring network around PGV cannot adequately measure the 
data necessary to make evacuation decisions if ambient H2S concentrations exceed 
500 ppb2 . 
1 The monitors are currently set to a range of 0 to 500 ppb to ensure that the H2S ambient requirements in 
the HDOH air operating permit can be adequately enforced. However, monitors with a wider dynamic range, from 
five to 1000 ppb, are now available, and monitoring equipment is fundable under EPA’s Clean Air Act Section 105 
grant to HDOH. 
2 The Review Team recognizes that PGV and HDOH currently have portable monitors that are available 
to measure ambient H2S levels greater than 500 ppb. 
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Recommendation: 
The Review Team recommends that stationary air monitors around the facility 
perimeter should measure continuously the higher H2S concentrations, greater than 
500 ppb. This is to ensure that local authorities can alert, warn, or evacuate the 
public quickly. PGV should share its real-time air monitoring data with the Pahoa 
Substation, so the local responders will know exactly what is occurring at PGV 
during an emergency. 
The Review Team also recommends that the County form a technical work group 
to evaluate evacuation needs, resources, and procedures. The technical work 
group could begin by reviewing H2S trigger levels, types of incidents, and the air 
monitoring network around PGV. The technical work group also may want to 
consider if stationary monitors should have alarms set to notify the County Civil 
Defense Agency and Fire Department automatically when H2S concentrations 
reach the alert, warning, or emergency levels. 
Technical work group members should include representatives from the County 
Civil Defense Agency and Fire Department, HDOH, the University of Hawai’i, and 
EPA. Work group members should confer with PGV technical staff on the details 
of facility operations. Technical issues under evaluation are extremely important 
and will require a great deal of thought, research, and professional judgement. 
Public participation should be included when setting new evacuation trigger levels. 
Based on comments EPA received regarding the draft report, EPA suggests that at 
least one member of the technical workgroup could represent the community-at­
large. 
7.2.2 Finding: 
The perimeter H2S air monitors are on an interruptible power supply. 
Circumstances causing power disruptions also may cause accidental H2S releases 
from the PGV facility. PGV personnel can monitor ambient conditions with hand­
held H2S monitors. 
Recommendation: 
The Review Team suggests that PGV and HDOH install, for their respective 
monitors, an adequate backup power source for the stationary H2S monitors. 
HDOH and PGV should maintain stationary H2S monitoring during power 
disruptions. 
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7.2.3 Finding: 
Hawai’i County Fire Department personnel noted that not all shifts from the Pahoa 
Substation have received site tours to familiarize them with the PGV facility or 
training in the hazards unique to PGV. This was a discussion item during the 
combined meeting with firefighters at the Pahoa Substation on August 8, 1996. 
The meeting included Hawai’i County Fire Department personnel, the EPA 
Review Team, and members of PGV management. 
Recommendation: 
The Review Team suggests that PGV provide site familiarization and training for 
all shifts of fire and HAZMAT response personnel from the local fire department, 
including: 
1. An overview of plant operations and process hazards, 
2. H2S and any other hazards unique to PGV, 
3. Safe handling practices of H2S and any other hazards unique to PGV, 
4. Facility procedures, information, and personnel responsibilities for emergency 
response; this should include the locations of all water hydrants, hydrocarbon 
monitors, and point source monitors for H2S. 
EPA notes that for the purposes of the PGV plan the hydrogen sulfide (H2S) 
monitors should measure air quality in the “breathing zone” of approximately six 
feet. There are no federal regulations which prescribe the requirements of siting 
hydrogen sulfide monitors. EPA monitoring regulations [40 CFR Part 58] address 
the monitoring of “criteria” pollutants, i.e. ozone, particulate matter, carbon 
monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO2 ), and lead. In 
general, EPA, State and local agencies collect data on these pollutants for use in 
regulatory programs mandated by the Clean Air Act. EPA monitoring regulations 
contain specific siting criteria for monitors that measure these pollutants. In order 
for the data collected to be valid for regulatory use, the criteria pollutant monitors 
must meet all relevant siting criteria, including probe height. However, since H2S 
is not a criteria pollutant, these regulations can be used as simply a guide to siting 
the samplers, not a requirement. 
Minimum probe heights for collecting ozone, CO, SO2 and NO2 data are three 
meters (about 10 feet). For particulate matter and lead monitoring, the minimum 
probe height is two meters (about 6.5 feet). The reason the minimum probe 
heights are set where they are is to obtain the most representative sample of 
ambient air in order to measure concentrations of a particular air criteria pollutant. 
If the probe is too close to the ground, the air sampled may be influenced by the 
effect of ground turbulence or near ground sources (e.g. automobile exhaust). 
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Since the object of the monitoring of H2S is to provide information to the 
community on H2S levels they are exposed to, not to implement a regulatory 
program mandated by the Clean Air Act, it is absolutely appropriate to site the 
monitor probes at the breathing height level (six feet). The data collected will be 
used to indicate whether certain actions in the emergency response plan should be 
triggered. If there are concerns about where the H2S is coming from (i.e. PGV, 
natural vents, automobiles, etc.) then supplementary monitors can be set up at 
different heights to try to assess contributions from different sources. The primary 
purpose of the H2S monitoring is to protect the health of the community; therefore, 
the monitoring sites operated by the Hawai’i DOH should sample air at breathing 
height (six feet). 
5. Where the outside agencies will meet, including alternate locations, when an 
incident occurs, and 
6. The interface between the agencies and the facility and the different 
responsibilities of each; this should include coordinated drills for rescuing injured 
PGV employees. 
Subsequent to the Review Team’s visit, PGV stated that it has provided increased 
site familiarization for all shifts of fire and HAZMAT response personnel in Pahoa 
and Hilo. 
7.2.4 Finding: 
PGV’s Emergency Response Plan (ERP) addresses magma intrusion. The ERP 
seems to imply that this event is controllable, but does not discuss the severity or 
likelihood of this event. 
Recommendation: 
Knowledge of this type of occurrence is outside the expertise of the review team. 
PGV should evaluate the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of a magma 
intrusion. PGV could draw upon the expertise of the University of Hawai’i, 
Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes and the U.S. Geological Survey’s 
Hawai’ian Volcano Observatory. PGV should share the results of the evaluation 
with the public. 
7.2.5 Finding: 
The effects of an earthquake of magnitude seven or greater on the PGV facility, 
including pentane piping and tanks and underground well casings, are unknown to 
the emergency response agencies. Seismic activity and its effects on structures are 
outside the expertise of the Review Team. 
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Recommendation: 
PGV should consult with a qualified and respected engineering firm to review and 
comment on the structural integrity of the facility, existing geothermal wells, and 
any new wells yet to be drilled. This engineering review should address whether 
the PGV facility would likely withstand earthquakes of magnitude seven or greater 
in the Puna locality. 
7.2.6 Finding: 
In Hawai’i, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know (EPCRA) 
Tier Two filing fees currently go directly to the State’s Superfund environmental 
response revolving fund and not to the Local Emergency Planning Committees 
(LEPCs). The Review Team finds that these funds are not returning to local 
agencies for emergency responder training. A lack of funds may compromise the 
training of local response personnel. 
In 1998, the Hawai’i County LEPC nominated two PGV employees to serve on its 
reactivated committee. The Hawai’i State Emergency Response Commission 
(SERC) confirmed their membership in August 1998. 
Recommendation: 
a. The LEPC should evaluate the training for local responders to decide if it is 
adequate and evaluate ways to improve training where appropriate. 
b. The Review Team encourages participation of industry on the Hawai’i County 
LEPC. This will greatly improve communication between responders and facilities 
and help to improve the quality of individual emergency response plans. 
c. The State of Hawai’i should channel some Tier Two filing fees to LEPCs for 
use in the training of HAZMAT response personnel. 
7.2.7 Finding: 
Hawai’i County has not recently conducted an exercise for hazardous materials 
response, and PGV has never participated in one. The last time the EPA co­
sponsored a HAZMAT exercise for Hawai’i County was 1993. Then, the exercise 
planning team mentioned PGV as a possible focus of the exercise. However, the 
hazardous materials exercise scenario selected by the planning team was the Port 
of Hilo in an industrial part of the city. 
On October 4, 1996, PGV had a release of H2S that exceeded the limit under the 
state’s air permit. The County and PGV should conduct a joint hazardous 
      
 
August, 2000 Final Report - 53 
materials response exercise to prepare for this type of release. FEMA’s guidance 
for training exercises suggests a progression, from less difficult to more difficult 
exercises. First a jurisdiction should conduct a tabletop exercise, then a functional 
exercise, and finally a full-field exercise. 
Recommendation: 
The Review Team recommends that local and state agencies and PGV plan and 
conduct a multiple jurisdictional hazmat response exercise. Participants should 
include Hawai’i County Civil Defense, Hawai’i County Fire Department, Hawai’i 
County and Keeau Police Departments, Hawai’i Department of Health and other 
agencies. Before conducting an exercise, participants should resolve many 
coordination issues and update their emergency response plans. 
Hawai’i County should conduct the complete series of exercises -- tabletop, 
functional and full-field, as recommended by FEMA. Additionally, exercise 
evaluators should critique each exercise and make this information available to the 
public. 
PGV should initiate and actively participate in at least one of these exercises with 
Hawai’i County. A tabletop or functional exercise between PGV and Hawai’i 
County should have a target completion date no later than two years after the 
release of this report. 
7.2.8 Finding: 
Under 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(2)(I) and (ix), the emergency response plan should 
address “pre-emergency planning and coordination with outside parties” as well as 
“emergency alerting and response procedures.” At the time of the review, the 
EAP did address internal alerting but did not clearly define the alerting of offsite 
emergency responders. 
Recommendation: 
In cooperation with the County of Hawai’i Civil Defense, both the Pahoa 
Substation and PGV should develop local emergency alert, warning and response 
procedures. Hawai’i County also should educate the public near the PGV facility 
regarding appropriate action that may be necessary. 
Hawai’i County and/or PGV should equip the Pahoa Substation with a 
combustible gas monitor, H2S detector, and UV/IR flame detector. PGV should 
work with the County to identify the appropriate equipment, train the Pahoa 
Substation personnel, and help maintain the equipment. PGV’s EAP or ERP 
should describe what actions operators will take when they hear a high alarm from 
one of the point source monitors for hydrogen sulfide and hydrocarbons. This 
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information should be communicated to the Pahoa Substation for the use of its first 
responders. 
7.2.9 Finding:
The Review Team found that public communications and access to chemical 
emergency planning information from PGV could improve. This is based on the 
EPA’s experiences with community requests for information, such as requests 
under the Freedom of Information Act. Community residents also raised 
comments about the availability of information during the August 1996 public 
meetings. Public comments are summarized in Table 2 at the end of Section 1. 
Recommendation: 
The Review Team strongly recommends that PGV improve and expand a program 
for proactive community outreach. One objective is to increase the flow of 
information for chemical emergency planning. Another important objective is to 
further improve the working relationship between the community and PGV.3 
3  PGV has recently provided updated information to EPA regarding its public outreach program. PGV 
reports that an average of one hundred visitors per month have toured the plant. In addition, PGV personnel have 
participated as guest lecturers at local schools and business organizations. PGV is maintaining published 
telephone lines which allow the general public to speak to plant personnel, ask questions, obtain information on 
plant activity, and file complaints. Through the Hawai’i Department of Health, PGV provides 24-hour-a-day 
hydrogen sulfide tables and charts from each of its air monitoring stations. PGV is constructing an Internet web 
page to allow electronic interaction with the community. Completion of the web page is expected by the end of the 
first quarter of 1999. PGV also reports that it provides other services and contributions to the community. For 
example, during the recent drought, PGV provided fire fighting equipment and water to assist the local fire 
department respond to a fire in the nearby Leilani Subdivision. 
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The Review Team recommends that Hawai’i County agencies ensure that EPCRA 
Tier Two information from all applicable facilities is readily available for 
emergency planning and response. 
In closing, the review team must emphasize that an emergency response plan alone 
does not directly protect the public and the environment. The plan is only a 
detailed blueprint of an emergency response program designed for a facility or 
community, with the purpose of protecting the environment and the public. 
Emergency response programs are the comprehensive approach to protecting the 
public. 
In addition to complete, updated and coordinated emergency response plans, 
jurisdictions and industries must have the required resources, equipment and 
trained personnel, to be fully prepared to implement the plans and respond to 
accidents resulting from man-made hazards as well as natural disasters. Finally, 
the authorities responsible for the emergency response programs must be assured 
at all times that the programs are workable. They need feedback through the 
results of scheduled periodic exercises. 
